The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has uncovered emerging methods being used by terrorist financiers to raise, transfer and conceal funds intended to support terrorist activities in Nigeria.
According to the NFIU’s 2025 Annual Report, obtained by The PUNCH, criminal networks are increasingly exploiting crowdfunding platforms, social media, mobile banking, money-transfer services and proxy bank accounts to disguise the movement of illicit funds.
The Unit said one emerging scheme involves foreign-based facilitators who use social media to solicit donations under the guise of humanitarian assistance or educational programmes. The campaigns are reportedly designed to attract large numbers of contributors, with individual donations kept relatively small.
The NFIU explained that donors may contribute between $50 and $500 through online payment platforms or conventional bank accounts. The funds are subsequently consolidated in a master account controlled by a senior member of the network who may be living legally outside Nigeria.
Once sufficient funds have accumulated, the money is divided into smaller transfers and sent through international money-transfer operators and remittance applications to individuals in Nigeria who serve as intermediaries.
The NFIU said these intermediaries may include students, small-business operators and relatives. Their involvement makes it more difficult for investigators and financial institutions to establish the original source of the money and identify its ultimate beneficiaries.
After receiving the funds, the intermediaries may convert them to cash, purchase items with legitimate civilian uses or transfer the money through mobile banking channels to individuals responsible for logistics and field operations.
The Unit described this process as the final stage in integrating funds raised through the network into terrorist operational financing.
Use of Female Proxy Accounts
The NFIU also identified the use of bank accounts belonging to women as another emerging terrorist-financing technique.
According to the report, terrorist financiers may use wives, sisters or female associates as fronts while male commanders or logistics personnel secretly control the accounts.
The arrangement can involve men retaining access to ATM cards, mobile-banking credentials and personal identification numbers associated with accounts formally registered to women.
The NFIU said the tactic creates an additional layer between illicit funds and the individuals actually controlling them. In some cases, the account holders may not be fully aware of the nature or scale of the transactions taking place through their accounts.
Misuse of SIM Cards and Phone Numbers
The financial-intelligence agency also raised concerns over the use of telephone numbers that are not registered to the actual owners or beneficiaries of bank accounts.
It said facilitators may use pre-registered SIM cards, numbers registered to deceased individuals and telephone lines associated with proxy account holders for mobile banking and transaction alerts.
According to the NFIU, such practices weaken the connection between bank accounts, SIM cards and Bank Verification Numbers (BVNs), making it more difficult for investigators to establish the identity of the person actually controlling an account.
The Unit warned that when a suspicious transaction is investigated, the telephone number may lead authorities to an unrelated individual rather than the person responsible for directing the funds.
Coded Transaction Descriptions
The NFIU further identified the use of transaction descriptions as another technique for concealing or managing terrorist financing.
It said some terrorist cells, including those linked to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), use detailed descriptions for financial transactions as part of an internal accounting system.
According to the report, repeated payments for logistics, particularly when they originate from one source and are distributed among several recipients, may indicate an organised financial structure.
However, the NFIU noted that other facilitators take the opposite approach by using seemingly harmless words, coded expressions, alphanumeric combinations or different languages to disguise the actual purpose of transactions.
Such descriptions can make it more difficult for automated banking systems to identify suspicious payments based on keywords.
Wider Financial Crime Threat
The NFIU said its analysis during the year revealed an increasingly interconnected threat involving financial crime, technology and cross-border activity.
Fraud remained one of the major underlying offences, with the Unit reporting increased concerns over Ponzi schemes, fraudulent crowdfunding operations, cryptocurrency-related investment scams and hacking-related fraud.
Criminals are also exploiting weaknesses in fintech platforms, particularly onboarding systems that allow certain accounts to be opened with limited identification requirements.
Digital platforms, according to the NFIU, have made it easier for fraudsters to recruit victims rapidly and move funds across different channels.
The agency also highlighted continuing risks involving the diversion and misappropriation of public funds. It identified government accounts belonging to finance officers and associated third parties as potential channels through which state and local government resources can be diverted.
Procurement activities and cash transactions were also identified as areas of concern because they can make financial trails more difficult to establish and illicit assets harder to trace.
Calls for Stronger Financial Monitoring
Security experts have called for stronger cooperation between financial institutions and security agencies to counter the increasingly sophisticated methods being used by criminal and terrorist networks.
Security expert Chidi Omeje said security agencies and financial regulators must continuously adapt their strategies because criminal groups are constantly developing new ways to bypass existing controls.
He stressed the importance of following financial trails and identifying the movement of illicit funds as part of efforts to disrupt terrorist and criminal networks.
Another security analyst, Lawrence Alobi, called for greater intelligence sharing between security agencies and financial institutions.
He said banks must strengthen identity verification and ensure that accounts are genuinely controlled by the individuals in whose names they are registered.
Alobi also urged authorities to hold financial institutions accountable where weaknesses in their systems are deliberately exploited or where institutions are found to have assisted illicit activities.
The NFIU said the findings from its analysis had been converted into targeted advisories, executive alerts and intelligence products designed to assist security agencies, reporting institutions and policymakers.
The findings underscore the growing importance of financial intelligence in Nigeria’s fight against terrorism and organised crime, particularly as criminal networks increasingly combine conventional banking systems with digital platforms, mobile-money services, remittance channels and identity proxies.
NFIU Uncovers Terrorist Financing Networks via Crowdfunding and Proxy Accounts
