Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Professor Attahiru Jega, expressed gratitude to all observers accredited in the forthcoming general elections, describing them as partners in progress with the country.
Jega gave the commendation making a speech at the briefing of accredited observers for the elections on Thursday.
He described the work of the observers as a means of providing INEC with dispassionate and rich assessments of the electoral process, which he said, adds value to the Commission's work.
Jega mentioned four factors that define the relationship between the observers and INEC as either conflictive or cooperative.
He said the factors are history or relationship, the perception of the country's commitment to the electoral process, the level of consolidation of the electoral process in a country and the specific individual attitudes of the leadership of both the Election Management Body and observer groups.
Read the full speech below:
« I would like to commence by thanking all of you for accepting to participate in this briefing of accredited election observers for the 2015 general elections. My gratitude is particularly founded considering that the elections had to be rescheduled when many of you, particularly the international observers, had started deployment in February. As a Commission, we deeply regret the inconvenience that may have caused you. However, we believe that in the circumstances that decision was necessary. Still, I hope that in spite of the problems you may have encountered, the rescheduling afforded you the opportunity to better contextualize the elections, improve your understanding of the environment and properly study INEC’s level of preparedness.
I must say that as a Commission, we greatly value our partnership with election stakeholders, particularly election observers. Your participation in elections often provides us with dispassionate and rich assessments of the electoral process, which add value to our work as a Commission. In fact, Observers’ reports on the 2011 general elections, many of which were produced by some of you in this room, have been like guidebooks for our preparations for the 2015 general elections. Often, relations between the EMBs like INEC and election observers in a fledgling democracy like ours oscillates between cooperation and conflict. A number of factors shape whether these relations are conflictive or cooperative. The first factor is the history of relations between election observers and the specific EMB. If that history has been one of suspicion, pressure and misunderstanding, observation of elections is likely to be repeatedly conflictive. Usually, there is a defining moment in these relations that entrenches this conflict dynamic. This is most likely to be an event in which observers and the EMB disagree fundamentally, which is not subsequently resolved. Once this threshold of conflict is crossed, it is always difficult to reverse the conflict dynamic. The irony is that the specific event that creates this conflict dynamic may only be related to one observer group. Yet, it could define the manner in which observers and EMB perceive each other for a long time.
The second factor is the broad image of the country and perceptions about whether the country and the EMB are truly committed to the democratic and electoral processes. Where a country is perceived not to be committed to conducting free, fair and credible elections, election observers are likely to be more aggressive, assertive or inquisitive, while the EMB would tend to deny access and cooperation.
The third factor is the level of consolidation of the electoral process in a country. Observers are likely to adopt more aggressive attitudes to a country’s election and its managers in early post-authoritarian elections. Subsequently, especially if election management keeps improving, the relations are likely to improve and become more cordial. Finally, the specific individual attitudes of the leadership of both the EMB and observer groups are important in defining their relations. Leaders on both sides must be willing to talk to each other, not talk at each other. Openness is central in forging cordial relations.
Luckily, at INEC we have enjoyed very cordial relations with both domestic and international observers since the 2011 general elections. This has been partly shaped by three things. In the first place, we established a transparent procedure for selecting observer groups. Calls for applications and/or the selection criteria are usually published in newspapers and our websites. The criteria are strictly applied and groups are ranked before selection is made.
Secondly, we developed comprehensive guidelines for election observation. The INEC Guidelines For Election Observation, which is available in both print and on our website, is based on global norms, standards and sources. Among these are the ECOWAS Principles of Democratic Elections, which is established by the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, the African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa of 2002 and the Cotonou Agreement signed between the European Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States in 2000.
The guidelines cover such things as processes of selection and accreditation of observers, code of conduct, responsibilities of both observers and INEC, as well as detailed description of the political and electoral processes in Nigeria. These guidelines are the normative basis for INEC’s engagement with foreign and local observers. The existence of these guidelines ensures that all parties recognize that election observation is a cooperative exercise in which all sides have rights and duties, which collectively ensure that the highest democratic standards apply.
Through its guidelines on election observation INEC seeks to frame three essential normative principles namely, rights, responsibilities and conduct of observers. Rights generally signify the entitlements of observers, responsibilities are the duties they bear, while conduct refers to behaviour and actions expected of them. Among the rights of observers are adequate security and protection, adequate information; free access to voting facilities, free movement and civil treatment. On the other hand, the responsibilities of observers include respecting the sovereignty and laws of Nigeria, abiding by guidelines and regulations of INEC, attendance at briefings, careful, dedicated observation and to issue honest report on the election. In their conduct, observers are also expected to declare any conflict of interest, be impartial and unobtrusive, ensure that their reports and conclusions are evidence-based, eschew prejudgment of the process, always carry proper identification, be careful about comments in the media, be prudent in receiving gifts and favours and avoid involvement in disputes. I implore you be conversant with the provisions of the Guidelines as you deploy to the field in the days that follow.
The third factor that has improved relations between observers and the Commission since 2011 is the establishment of the INEC Situation Room. This has made it possible for the Commission to respond rapidly to certain urgent observations made by observers. In other words, unlike in the past, the Commission does not have to wait for months after elections to receive reports, when it could intervene during elections to solve problems. The real-time report of events in the field to the Situation Room and the rapid intervention of the Commission when necessary have improved the quality of the electoral process and improved confidence between observers and the Commission.
I would like to draw your attention to one cardinal distinction that INEC makes through its guidelines for election observation. That is the distinction between election observation and election monitoring. According to the INEC Guidelines for Election Observation, there is a fundamental difference between the two. An election monitor is an integral part of the election management structure and has a role in the administration of the election. In Nigeria, only the Independent National Election Commission (INEC) and its duly authorized personnel are empowered to monitor elections. An Observer on the other hand does not have any role in the administration of the election nor any control or oversight functions. To further simplify these points:
An election monitor exercises some level of lawful authority over the conduct of elections as well as over officials involved; an Observer has no such powers.
· In Nigeria, a monitor must be a duly authorised personnel of the INEC; an Observer is independent and reports only to his or her organisation
· A monitor can issue instructions and take decisions on behalf of INEC and to that extent would ordinarily possess a greater technical knowledge of the election process than an Observer.
· To enable them fulfil their functions effectively, INEC is responsible for training election monitors on election administration. The training of election Observers is the responsibility of the organisations that deploy them.
· The roles, powers and functions of monitors are created and regulated and the authority so exercised is clearly spelt out.
It is important to clarify these because observers in the past sometimes overreach the limits of our conception of observation, which often results in tension and disagreements. Indeed, the Nigerian legal system expressly states that a cardinal function of INEC is to monitor the electoral process.
I would like to end this address by giving you a brief update on our preparedness for the elections in order to assure you that we are on course. I am aware that there are still lingering concerns on whether the elections would hold or not. Let me say that I do not see any indication from any quarters of any wish to further postpone the elections. After the rescheduling of the elections, the Commission met, reviewed the situation and decided on how best to utilize the six-week extension to add value to operational and logistical preparations for the elections. We believe that effective utilization of the period of extension would enable INEC to a vastly improved 2015 general elections. The highlights of the decisions, which are already being implemented, are as follows:
1. Field Evaluations: National Commissioners to visit all the State offices between February 11 and 19, 2015, they conducted evaluations and comprehensively determined levels of preparations in the field.
2. Headquarters Evaluations: Following the field visits, on February 20th and 21st, the Commission, together with heads of Departments, Directorates and Units, met and reviewed the field assessment and determined what specific additional things need to be done before March 28th.
3. On February 24th, a meeting of the Inter-agency Consultative Committee on Elections Security (ICCES), was held to discuss security arrangements for the rescheduled elections.
4. On March 7, field demonstration of the Card Reader were held in all Polling Units in sampled Wards in 12 states, 2 from each of the 6 geopolitical zones.
5. On March 11, a meeting of the Commission with Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) will hold to review progress of additional things done and to finalize arrangements for the March 28 and April 11 elections.
Prioritized areas of focus for the six-week period of extension are as follows:
a. Collection of PVCs: the period for the collection was first extended by 4 weeks to March 8, and subsequently further extended to March 22. We have been making every effort to ensure that the maximum numbers of voters possible collect their PVCs before the elections. We have also been providing regular updates to the public on various aspects of the collection, particularly the rate and distribution of collection. We are glad that these efforts have yielded fruits, with PVC collection increasing to a national average of over 81% in the last four weeks.
b. More public demonstration of the Card Readers in each geo-political zone was conducted on March 7. The demonstration entailed the full process of accreditation such as would take place during the elections proper. Twelve States, two from each of the six geopolitical zones, were used for the demonstration namely, Delta, Rivers, Nasarawa, Niger, Anambra, Ebonyi, Kebbi, Kano, Lagos, Ekiti, Bauchi and Taraba States. One Ward (Registration Area) was randomly selected in each State and all the Polling Units in the Ward were then used for the demonstration. For a mock demonstration, the turnout was satisfactory, with close 17,000 voters nationwide. The demonstration was also largely satisfactory with close to 100% verification and 60% authentication. The result of biometric authentication for Ebonyi was unusually low and we have not only been thoroughly investigating this, we also repeated the demonstration on March 14 with better results. Measures are being taken to address the challenges observed, which seem to be responsible for the observed low level of authentication.
c. Additional training for ad hoc staff, especially for those who are going to handle the Card Readers is currently going on. All SPOs have had one day additional refresher training while POs and APOs handling Card Readers are undergoing a 2-day additional hands-on training. Innovative training materials, including downloadable videos and phone apps have been developed to make for easier and effective learning.
d. Intensify voter education and public enlightenment on Election Day procedures. We acknowledge and appreciate the intervention of the EU through JDBF, DGD II Programme.
e. Arrangements for Election Day logistics to be intensified by RECs, especially transportation in consultation with the NURTW, in the context of the MOU already signed with the Union.
f. Wide consultations and interactions with stakeholders have also been held. Apart from the meeting with ICCES, the Commission has also held several interactions with civil society organizations, development partners and the diplomatic community. In addition, it has met with political parties and briefed the National Assembly on diverse aspects of the elections. Finally, the Commission has established a weekly press briefing by the National Commissioner in-charge of publicity. This provides an opportunity to share information and answer various concerns of members of the public. On Tuesday March 24, a National Stakeholders Summit is scheduled for ‘last minute’ Briefing preceding the elections.
In addition to the above areas, the Commission has made arrangements to enable IDPs to vote. This will apply to IDPs from areas that are worst hit by the insurgency, specifically in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. The plan is to create voting Centres in safe areas.
In conclusion, INEC deeply appreciates the positive roles of both domestic and foreign observers in Nigeria’s electoral process. We welcome you to freely observe the 2015 general elections in accordance with existing guidelines and the laws of the land. The Commission looks forward to your reports as it continues to work to improve the electoral process and democratic practice in Nigeria. I wish you the very best as you deploy across the country.
Thank you.
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More than 76 ISWAP terrorists have abandoned their enclaves and surrendered to troops within the North-East theatre of operations as part of the Joint Task Force (North East), Operation HADIN KAI (OPHK), and continued operational successes.
The North East geopolitical zone comprises six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe.
In a statement by the Acting Military Information Officer, Headquarters Joint Task Force North East Operation Hadin Kai, Captain Mohammed Goni, revealed that among those who surrendered were key members of the terrorist network, due to relentless military pressure.
“The development highlights the devastating impact of the sustained offensive by Operation HADIN KAI, which continues to dismantle terrorist strongholds, disrupt command and logistics structures, and deny the insurgents freedom of action across the theatre”.
“Persistent military operations have continued to degrade the terrorists’ combat capabilities while eroding confidence within their ranks and leadership. Within the last week alone, a total of 76 terrorist foot soldiers with some families surrendered to troops”
“They are currently in a secure location undergoing profiling, debriefing, and other established procedures in accordance with extant operational protocols,” the statement reads in part.
According to Captain Goni, the operational gains demonstrate the effectiveness of the Nigerian military’s comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy, combining precision combat operations, intelligence-led engagements, and coordinated joint efforts with partners.
He added that “the Operation HADIN KAI remains resolute in its mission to completely defeat terrorism and restore lasting peace and security across the North-East and the pressure on the remaining terrorist elements will continue unabated until they are completely neutralised or forced to surrender”.
For decades, the financial elite of Zurich and London viewed international drug trafficking as a coarse, localized problem. It was a menace measured in street corners, plastic baggies, and gang rivalries. However, a major global sting operation has smashed this illusion. The arrest of Nigerian billionaire Amadi Simon in Switzerland, alongside his female co-conspirators in West Africa, reveals a much deeper issue. It exposes a sophisticated, multi-billion-dollar network where modern fintech, West African drug wealth, and Russian sanctions evasion meet. This case is not just about a single drug bust. It serves as a modern lesson in how easily global finance can be weaponized. When illicit drug cash from European streets can flow smoothly into the Russian financial system through Swiss fintech firms, Western regulators must face a harsh truth: their digital anti-money laundering systems are failing.
The Mirror of the Network
At the center of this web sits Amadi Simon, a high-profile tycoon who lived luxury lives in both Nigeria and Western Europe. While he presented himself as a legitimate businessman, international investigators saw a different reality. They uncovered a massive, globe-spanning drug baron. The network operated with corporate precision: The African Anchor: In Nigeria, female kingpins Jecinta Amara Ikechi and Blessing Ngozi Amadi managed the local footprint. They ran operations in Anambra and Delta states to handle logistics and secure assets. The Swiss Conduit: In Zurich, Sergey Salpanov, a Russian-trained lawyer turned tech founder led Swiss Remit. This fintech firm provided the crucial financial pipeline for the group. Together, these players linked West African networks with European drug markets and eastern financial systems.
Weaponizing the Fintech Frontier
The cartel successfully bypassed traditional global banks by exploiting the gaps in modern financial technology. Traditional banks use slow compliance systems that flag suspicious transactions days after they occur. Fintech apps like Swiss Remit, however, pride themselves on instant, cross-border transfers.
The network exploited this speed to stay ahead of the law. They poured cash into virtual banking platforms through complicit money transfer businesses. Once the dirty paper money became "digital ledger cash," the fintech infrastructure quickly routed it into Russian financial systems or crypto assets.
To hide their digital tracks, the cartel used a strategy known as "nested banking." They passed funds through a confusing maze of foreign exchange businesses, shell companies, and virtual wallets. This completely hid the original owners of the cash. They also broke up large deposits into small amounts using "money mule" accounts opened with fake or stolen IDs. By the time computer algorithms flagged the transactions, the money had already cleared and disappeared into another country.
From Laundromats to Luxury Hotels
When the money returned to Nigeria, it was poured directly into the local economy to look like legitimate profit. The cartel relied heavily on high-end luxury hospitality assets to blend their drug wealth with clean, mainstream commercial cash flows. Following Simon's arrest, Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency working closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), moved swiftly to seize his multi-billion naira real estate portfolio: Jovi Hotel Asaba: a prime hospitality property used as a major commercial footprint in the Delta State capital. Jovi Hotel and Suites Agbor: a prominent multi-story hotel venture built to absorb massive amounts of cash. Jovi Apartment Abuja: a luxury residential complex in the upscale Mabushi district used as an administrative front. Alongside these physical properties, authorities froze numerous traditional bank accounts and cryptocurrency wallets. These accounts held hundreds of billions of naira in digital ledger cash before they could be moved out of the country.
The Geopolitical Trap
The most alarming aspect of this case for Western security agencies is how organized crime intersects with geopolitics. By routing hundreds of millions in drug wealth directly into Russian financial systems, these networks do more than just clean dirty money. They create alternative pipelines of hard currency into Russia, bypassing traditional banking guardrails and international sanctions. For the Kremlin, cash-heavy networks like Simon’s are highly useful. They offer a steady supply of Western currency that is completely hidden from the eyes of global regulators. This exposes the fatal flaw in the West's current economic defense system. While governments impose strict sanctions on paper, the digital backdoors remain open. A fintech startup in Zurich can accidentally undermine the foreign policy of major world powers, simply by failing to verify the identities of its users.
The Way Forward
Dismantling this network required an extraordinary international coalition, including the NDLEA, the U.S. DEA, and Swiss and Greek federal authorities. This level of cooperation shows that law enforcement can successfully work together across borders. However, chasing criminals after the money has already moved is no longer enough. If governments want to protect the global financial system, they must change how they regulate the fintech sector. Fintech platforms can no longer be allowed to prioritize speed and user growth over basic security. Regulators must enforce strict, real-time identity checks and treat virtual banking platforms with the same scrutiny as traditional banks. Until the digital loopholes are closed, global syndicates will continue to exploit the international financial system—laundering drug money, evading sanctions, and hiding their wealth in plain sight.
In The Spotlight
President Bola Tinubu's Democracy Day address was an exercise in a peculiar form of political optimism: the sort that flourishes most luxuriantly when reality is at its bleakest. One almost admired its audacity.
The address read more like a dispatch from a parallel republic, blissfully detached from the grim realities of the nation he governs. To praise twenty-seven years of unbroken civilian rule is a fine thing for history books, but it offers cold comfort to citizens who cannot afford bread. Nigeria is currently caught in a vice of worsening socio-economic misery and pervasive insecurity, making the president's lofty rhetoric feel not just out of touch, but deeply offensive.
As schoolchildren languish in captivity, as retired generals die in the custody of bandits, as churches and mosques organize national prayers against insecurity, and as vast swathes of rural Nigeria remain subject to the whims of terrorists, kidnappers and armed gangs, the President invited Nigerians to celebrate "the enduring Nigerian spirit" and contemplate a nation moving "from uncertainty to stability". The most striking failure of empathy in the address is the lecture directed at Nigeria’s youth. Tinubu urges them to "build here, code here, work here, and vote here," scolding those who leave as "abandoning ship." This is a rich demand from a political elite whose own children are routinely educated and housed abroad. Young Nigerians are not leaving out of a lack of patriotism. They are fleeing a system that actively stifles their talent, devalues their labor, and threatens their physical safety. To expect the youth to stay and fix a broken ship while the captains lounge in luxury is not leadership; it is rank hypocrisy that stinks to the high Heavens.
Democracy Day is, of course, a suitable occasion for reflection. The heroes of June 12 deserve remembrance. The struggle against military dictatorship remains one of the noblest chapters in Nigeria's modern history. Yet the purpose of democracy is not merely to remember freedom; it is to exercise it. Citizens cannot meaningfully enjoy liberty when they are afraid to travel roads, cultivate farms, attend schools, or sleep in their homes. The President himself inadvertently acknowledged this contradiction when he declared that "democracy without security is a mirage." Quite so. Democratic institutions are empty shells if they cannot provide basic human security. While Tinubu extols the virtues of resolving disagreements in courtrooms rather than through violence, millions of Nigerians face a different kind of daily violence. Wild inflation and a collapsing currency have made feeding a family an act of daily heroism. Bandits, kidnappers, and insurgent groups operate with terrifying freedom across vast swathes of the country. The state's primary duty is to protect its people and their livelihoods. In this duty, the current administration is failing. Celebrating the "ballot" when the state cannot secure the "bourse" or the "boma" is a luxury only the ruling class can afford.
The difficulty is that this statement functions less as a defense of his administration than as its most devastating indictment. For if democracy without security is indeed a mirage, then millions of Nigerians are currently inhabiting precisely such a mirage. The President's solution was familiar: statistics. Thirteen thousand terrorists neutralized. Terror-related deaths down. Thousands recruited into the police and military. Trillions allocated to defense. Governments facing difficult questions often retreat into arithmetic. Numbers possess an attractive quality. They cannot be interrupted. They do not ask follow-up questions. They create the impression of progress without the inconvenience of proving it. Yet Nigerians are not experiencing security through spreadsheets. They experience it through the inability to move freely across their own country. They experience it through ransom payments. They experience it through abandoned villages. They experience it through children kidnapped from schools. They experience it through the extraordinary fact that a retired Major General; a man who once stood near the apex of Nigeria's security establishment could be abducted and die in captivity. If the state could not protect one of its former defenders, what reassurance does it offer everyone else?
There was something especially curious about the President's plea that Nigerians should not "assign blame or point fingers." In ordinary circumstances this might sound statesmanlike. In a democracy it sounds peculiar. Assigning responsibility is, after all, one of the principal functions of democratic government. Citizens elect leaders precisely so that someone may be held accountable when things go wrong. A President asking citizens not to assign blame for a worsening security crisis is rather like a football manager urging supporters not to discuss the scoreline. One suspects the request is made because the scoreline is unfavorable. The address was similarly optimistic about the economy. Reforms have restored credibility. Investment is returning. Revenues are rising. Stability is replacing uncertainty. Perhaps. But the true measure of an economy is not found in ministerial presentations or investment brochures. It is found in kitchens, markets and pay packets. There is a reason the administration repeatedly tells Nigerians that prosperity is coming. It is because prosperity has not yet arrived.
The political danger for Tinubu is not merely that Nigerians are suffering. Nations can endure hardship when they believe sacrifices are producing visible results. The greater danger is that citizens increasingly feel they are being asked to trust official narratives that bear little resemblance to their daily experience. The President spoke eloquently of hope. Hope is a valuable political commodity. But it is not an inexhaustible one. The tragedy of contemporary Nigeria is not that its leaders lack ambition. The speech was full of ambition. It was rich with plans, reforms, initiatives, task forces, strategies and promises. The tragedy is that these aspirations coexist with a mounting sense that the state is losing its monopoly on security in significant parts of the country.
A government may survive economic disappointment. It may survive political controversy. What it cannot indefinitely survive is the perception that it cannot perform the most elementary function of government: protecting citizens from violence. The most revealing line of the speech may not have been the celebration of democracy or the defense of reform. It was the President's appeal to traditional rulers, faith leaders and community heads because "the government cannot do it alone." That was intended as a call for national solidarity. It sounded, instead, like an admission. For governments are not elected merely to join collective efforts. They are elected to lead them. The heroes of June 12 fought so Nigerians could choose their leaders. They did not fight so that elected leaders could explain why they are unable to secure the republic entrusted to them.
The president invites criticism from the press and civil society, calling them the "guardrails of our republic." Yet, these guardrails are being tested to the breaking point by economic mismanagement and official corruption. A democracy cannot be strengthened by speeches alone. It requires a government willing to cut its own waste, secure its borders, and create an environment where business can breathe. Until the Tinubu administration faces these harsh truths, Democracy Day will remain a celebration for the politicians, while the rest of Nigeria continues to suffer. Twenty-seven years after the restoration of democracy, Nigerians deserve more than commemorations of freedom. They deserve the substance of it. And until insecurity ceases to dominate national life, until children can attend school without fear, until citizens can travel without calculating ransom values, until communities no longer depend on prayer as a substitute for protection, the gap between official rhetoric and lived reality will continue to widen. Democracy Day was meant to celebrate how far Nigeria has come. Instead, it served as a reminder of how far it still has to go.
Opinions
In The Spotlight
Yes, Nigeria’s presidential election is seven months away and the campaigns, should there be any, have not begun.
But today, I will tell you how it will play out and who will win.
First, let us recall that Bola Ahmed Tinubu won the contest in 2023 on a nationally embarrassing record-low 26.72% voter turnout.
Of that, he received just 36.61% (8,794,726 votes), the lowest winning share in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. He is ruling Nigeria on less than nine million votes.
That happened because a fragmented opposition split the anti-incumbent majority three ways. But Atiku Abubakar (29.07%), Peter Obi (25.40%) and Rabiu Kwankwaso (6.23%) together secured 60.7% of the vote, collectively outpolling Tinubu by a wide margin.
Here in June 2026, three and a half years later, that fragmentation has worsened. His principal 2023 contestants, Atiku Abubakar and the Obi-Kwankwaso bloc, are again on separate platforms following the collapse of the Ibadan coalition just two months ago, where they had teased unity and collaboration.
Tinubu enters 2027 with a deeply unpopular economic record (peak inflation above 34%, 643% petrol price rise, 141 million in multidimensional poverty), a worsening security crisis 19,980 killed, 12,362 abducted since May 2023 per CSO data), and an Electoral Act 2026 widely criticized for entrenching incumbency.
Nothing exposes the futility of the administration more than the numbers in its own flagship document, PROMISES DELIVERED, published on its third anniversary last month, a self-indictment and that in normal times would be a major liability in an election year.
But the structural advantages of office, access to resources of all forms and sizes, and his All-Progressives Congress control of 31 states and the National Assembly make him a clear favourite.
The biggest factor granting him that status? The fragmented opposition.
But history demonstrates that even fragmented oppositions can win.
In Zambia in 2021, Hakainde Hichilema, in his sixth presidential run and third contest against Edgar Lungu, defeated the incumbent.
His UPND, which was backed by an alliance of 10 opposition parties, “won with 2,810,777 votes to Mr Lungu’s 1,814,201,” the BBC reported: a landslide of more than a million votes.
But Nigerians do not really need to advance beyond their own boundaries to identify a model that has worked. In February 2015, three opposition parties (ACN, CPC, ANPP) and a faction of the ruling PDP merged and became the APC: not a loose alliance, but a genuine party merger.
To understand what happened eight years earlier, consider that Mr Tinubu, the architect of that merger, did not contest the presidential ticket. It went instead to Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner better positioned to deliver the core North vote, balanced by southern running mate Yemi Osinbajo.
Buhari defeated incumbent Goodluck Jonathan by 2.6 million votes, marking the first time an opposition party unseated a ruling party in Nigeria and the country’s first peaceful transfer of power between political parties. The APC achieved the feat with a nine-point margin.
What made that triumph possible were the factors of a single merged platform, a credible candidate with a fixed support base, elite willingness to subordinate personal ambition, the defection of disaffected PDP governors, and a unifying “change” message amid economic discontent and insecurity. It is these same factors that are about to put opposition political egos in Nigeria on trial.
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The APC merger of 2015 and Zambia’s 2021 UPND coalition are excellent models, but only when rivals subordinate personal ambition to a single ticket early, build a genuinely merged party, and deploy parallel vote protection. As I write this article, Nigeria’s opposition has done none of these.
As last week ended, all the major parties appeared to be proceeding as if they have all the time in the world, not only between themselves, but towards APC, while the Obi-Kwankwaso ADC was dangling from the edge of political exclusion.
Translation: the opposition’s greatest enemy is not Tinubu’s machinery but its own dysfunction.
The way forward for Nigeria’s opposition is clear: learn from APC, and from Mr Tinubu, who in 2015 began to play the long game. That game became “Emilokan” in 2023, executed with his “Grab it, snatch it, run with it” philosophy. From the point of view of strategy, it worked.
For today’s opposition, the time for a merger is now gone, but the long game is still available to the opposition if it wants to be a credible, competitive entity now and in the future.
First, and understanding that fragmentation hands victory to the incumbent, they must now pick one candidate behind one party and let the loser’s ego be bought out the way APC did it in 2015. And no, don’t pretend that personal goodwill will settle the ticket. Resolve the presidential question through a pre-announced method that all major camps sign before the process begins. That method should combine two criteria that matter in Nigeria’s system: electability and spread.
Nobody should be pressured merely to “step down for Nigeria,” but they should sign a political contract that makes stepping down survivable.
Concede that Obi (who has the youth/southern energy and the cleaner brand) and Atiku (who has northern reach) cannot both run.
The 2015 template, where Tinubu ceded the ticket to the better-positioned Buhari and took compensating influence, is the proven path. With the primary window now closed, the only practical plan would be to build a state-by-state non-aggression and joint-ticket framework.
Nigeria is a federation, and opposition strategy should behave like one, pooling and pulling together rather than testing against one another everywhere.
A realistic alliance would pair a single presidential ticket with negotiated zoning for Senate, House, governorship, and state-level endorsements in places where one camp is plainly stronger than the others.
The losing camps should receive guaranteed and written compensation, such as running-mate negotiations, campaign leadership roles, and cabinet-allocation principles.
The second element is to invest in building result-protection infrastructure to neutralise the Electoral Act 2026 loophole, learning from Zambia’s parallel vote tabulation. Because Section 60(3) leaves “communication failure” undefined and removes the real-time upload requirement, the opposition cannot rely on INEC’s IReV alone. It should train, equip, and station paid polling agents in as many of the 176,000 polling units as possible, instructed to photograph and transmit signed EC8A forms and to document any “communication failure” in real time; and run an independent parallel vote tabulation with civil-society partners.
The third element is to expand the base and raise turnout.
Tinubu won 2023 on 26.72% turnout; the opposition’s structural advantage is the hungry, angry and disengaged majority, including the newly registered young voters. A unified ticket should:
Prioritise voter mobilisation and PVC collection drives in high-population, low-turnout urban centres.
Craft a single economic-relief and security message.
Lock in a credible North-South balanced ticket to avoid the zoning resentment that has repeatedly fractured both the PDP and the coalition.
The coalition should avoid trying to write a manifesto that reconciles every ideological difference. It is more realistic to agree on a concise covenant built around five or six issues that cut across region, religion, class and party.
Because while Tinubu is deeply vulnerable, he is not weak. One army can defeat him, but not two or three, no matter how powerful they may individually be.